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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Layton Barone appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his
conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. On appeal, Barone challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In its Memorandum Decision and Order denying Barone’s motion to suppress, the
district court set forth the following facts, which have not been challenged by the parties
on appeal:
On September 18, 2016 at approximately 6:54 p.m., Officer
Hutchison responded to a report of suspicious circumstances in the
Safeway parking lot at 1001 N. 4th Street, Coeur d’Alene Idaho.
According to that report, a man was attempting to break into a car at that
location and the car’s alarm was going off. The reporting party described
the car as black with tinted windows and no plates and said it was
occupied by a male, female, and “other parties.” Upon arriving at the
Safeway parking lot, Officer Hutchison did not hear a car alarm.
However, he approached a parked car that, in his opinion, otherwise
matched the description given. The car he approached was black with
tinted windows, it had no licenses plates but did have a temporary
registration slip taped in the rear window, and it was occupied by a female
driver, male passenger, and three children in the backseat. Before
reaching the car and from a distance of approximately 15 feet, Officer
Hutchison “noted that the front seat occupants appeared extremely
agitated and fidgety.” At that time, Officer Hutchison suspected that the
male passenger was under the influence of a stimulant.
Upon reaching the car, Officer Hutchison knocked on the driver
side window, the female driver rolled down the window, and Officer
Hutchison explained the purpose of his contact to the female driver. The
female driver verbally identified herself as Breonna Morris (“Morris”) and
the male passenger identified himself as James Barone (“Barone”) using
his Idaho driver’s license. Morris informed Officer Hutchison that she
owned the car and showed him that the keys to the car were in the ignition.
A second police officer, Officer Wiedebush, arrived at the scene at about
that time. Upon his arrival, Officer Wiedebush contacted dispatch and
1

began running Barone, Morris, and the car through dispatch.
Simultaneously, Officer Wiedebush began questioning Morris, while
Officer Hutchison spoke with Barone.
Officer Hutchison then asked Barone to step out of the car, and
Barone complied. After Barone got out of the car, Officer Hutchison
“smelled meth coming off of his person.” At the January 4, 2007, hearing,
Officer Hutchison testified as to his training and extensive experience as to
the unique smell of methamphetamine. He testified that he encountered
methamphetamine nearly every day, both as a jail deputy and as a patrol
officer. He also noted Barone’s gaunt appearance, picked scabs on
Barone’s face and arms, and Barone’s inability to stay still. Officer
Hutchison described Barone’s movements as “twitchy” and noted
Barone’s tendency of touching and itching his arms. Officer Hutchison
“confronted Barone regarding methamphetamine (meth) use.” Barone
denied any recent use. Officer Hutchison asked Barone if he had any
contraband in his pockets. Barone responded by emptying his pockets and
putting the contents of his pockets on the trunk of the car. By doing so,
Officer Hutchison observed Barone pull a bindle baggie out of his pocket
and place it on the trunk of the car, while [he] simultaneously “poked
something back into his coin pocket.” Officer Hutchison questioned
Barone about his use of the car, the three children in the car, a previous
domestic call involving Barone and Morris (in which Officer Hutchison
was involved), and Barone’s physical condition. While doing so, Officer
Wiedebush conducted a consent search of the car. As a result of that
search, Officer Hutchison saw Officer Wiedebush remove a package of
hypodermic needles from the car’s rear passenger compartment. Officer
Hutchison then searched Barone’s right coin pocket and located a baggie
containing a “white crystal substance [that he] recognized as meth.”
Officer Hutchison arrested Barone for possession of a controlled
substance.
(R., pp.82-84 (citations omitted).)

The state charged Barone with possession of

methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.37-38.)
Barone filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered by officers and statements
made by Barone prior to his arrest. (11/17/16 Motion to Suppress. 1) Barone argued: (1)
the officers unlawfully extended the detention of Barone; and (2) Officer Hutchison’s

1

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Barone’s motion to augment the appellate record with
Barone’s motion to suppress, which did not appear in the clerk’s record. (11/2/17 Order.)
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search of Barone was not a lawful Terry 2 frisk, and, even if it was, the officer exceeded
the lawful scope of the search. (R., pp.57-68.) In response, the state argued that the
investigative detention was lawful, and that the search was justified by Terry and by the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.69-76.)
After a suppression hearing at which Officer Hutchison testified, (Tr., p.4, L.3 –
p.38, L.12), the district court denied Barone’s motion to suppress (R., pp.81-102). The
court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript and made factual findings.
(R., pp.81-84.) The court concluded: (1) the officers’ investigative detention of Barone
was based on reasonable suspicion and was therefore lawful; (2) Officer Hutchison’s
search of Barone was not justified under Terry because Officer Hutchison lacked
reasonable suspicion that Barone was armed and dangerous; 3 and (3) Officer Hutchison’s
search of Barone was justified by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement because, even though the formal arrest did not occur until after the search,
Officer Hutchison possessed probable cause, at the time of the search, that Barone was
under the influence of a controlled substance in public in violation of I.C. § 37-2732C.
(Id.)
Barone entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia, preserving his right to appeal from the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress. (R., pp.105-107; Tr., p.40, L.3 – p.49, L.6.) The
district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with three years fixed on the felony
charge, but suspended the sentence and placed Barone on supervised probation for three

2

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

3

The state does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.
3

years. (R., pp.112-118; Tr., p.68, Ls.6-13.) The court imposed a suspended jail sentence
and unsupervised probation on the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge. (R., p.111; Tr.,
p.68, Ls.2-6.) Barone timely appealed. (R., pp.119-122.)

4

ISSUE
Barone states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Barone’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Barone failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
Barone Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
While acknowledging that Officer Hutchison possessed probable cause, at the

time of the search, to arrest him for being under the influence of a controlled substance in
public, Barone contends that the search was not justified by the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirements because, Barone asserts, Officer Hutchison would
not have arrested him if not for the discovery of the methamphetamine. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.8-11.) Barone’s argument fails because a review of the record and of the totality
of the circumstances surrounding Officer Hutchison’s contact with Barone indicates that,
at the time of search, Officer Hutchison had not affirmatively decided that he was going
to release Barone rather than arrest him.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the court] freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Faith, 141
Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Search Incident To Arrest
Exception Applied And, As A Result, Barone Was Not Entitled To Suppression
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

“A

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and
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well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870,
873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)).
A search incident to a lawful arrest is one such exception to the warrant requirement and,
as such, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 (1969); Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. “For an arrest to be considered
lawful, it must be based on probable cause” to believe the arrestee has committed a
crime. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citations
omitted). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been or is being committed.” Id.
(citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement could apply where the arrest occurred after the search. The Court concluded
that “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of
petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded
the arrest rather than vice versa.” Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110 (citations omitted).
The Idaho Court of Appeals applied Rawlings in State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,
266 P.3d 1220 (Ct. App. 2011). An officer saw a marijuana pipe in plain view in Smith’s
vehicle, and therefore had probable cause that Smith was guilty of possessing drug
paraphernalia. Smith, 152 Idaho at 119-120, 266 P.3d at 1224-1225. The officer then
searched a backpack that Smith had retrieved from the vehicle during the traffic stop,
from which he recovered marijuana. Id. at 117-118, 266 P.3d at 1222-1223. The officer
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formally arrested Smith only after the marijuana was discovered in the backpack. Id. at
119, 266 P.3d at 1224. The Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search of the
backpack prior to Smith’s formal arrest came within the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 118-121, 266 P.3d at 1223-1226. The Court
stated that, “[s]o long as the search and the arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and
the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest.” Id. at
119, 266 P.3d at 1224 (citations omitted).
Recently, in State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 402 P.3d 1095 (2017), the Idaho
Supreme Court analyzed a different question – whether the search incident to arrest
exception applies when an officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect, but has
affirmatively decided not to arrest to the suspect until after a search reveals contraband.
An officer pulled Lee’s vehicle over and learned through dispatch that Lee had a
suspended driver’s license. Lee, 162 at ___, 402 P.3d at 1098-1099. The officer frisked
Lee and found several cylindrical containers. Id. 162 at ___, 402 P.3d at 1099. The
officer told Lee that he was “going to get a citation for driving without privileges,” and
then detained Lee by placing him his patrol vehicle. Id. The officer then searched the
containers and found a powdery residue. Id. The state charged Lee with possession of
controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without privileges.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court first held that, while the officer was permitted to pat down
Lee for weapons pursuant to Terry, the officer exceeded the permissible scope of the
Terry frisk by opening the containers. Id. at ___, 402 P.3d at 1100-1102.

8

The Court then considered whether the search of the containers could be justified
under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at ___, 402
P.3d at 1102-1106. The Court noted that the search incident to arrest exception is
justified by two historical rationales: “(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial.” Id. at ___,
402 P.3d at 1103 (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116 (1998)). Considering
these historical rationales, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a search incident to
arrest is not constitutionally reasonable when no arrest was going to occur if not for the
officer’s discovery of the fruits of the search. Id. at ___, 402 P.3d at 1104-1105.
The Court next discussed how it would determine whether an arrest was going to
occur if not for the discovery of the fruits of the search:
We determine if an arrest is going to occur based on the totality of the
circumstances, including the officer’s statements. While the subjective
intent of an officer is usually not relevant in Fourth Amendment analysis,
statements made by the officer of his intentions along with other objective
facts are relevant in the totality of circumstances as to whether an arrest is
to occur. If an arrest does not occur, and objectively the totality of the
circumstances show an arrest is not going to occur, an officer cannot
justify a warrantless search based on the search incident to arrest
exception.
Id. at ___, 402 P.3d at 1105.
In reviewing the totality of evidence surrounding the traffic stop in Lee, the Idaho
Supreme Court noted the officer’s statement to Lee that Lee would be cited for driving
without privileges. Id. at ___, 402 P.3d at 1105-1106. The Court also noted that, in
considering the historical rationale for the search incident to arrest exception of evidence
preservation, all of the evidence that was needed to issue Lee a citation for driving
without privileges had already been obtained before the search of the containers. Id. at

9

___, 402 P.3d at 1104. The Court concluded that no arrest was to occur prior to the
officer finding controlled substances in the containers, that the search was therefore a
search incident only to an intended citation, and that the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement could thus not justify the search. Id. at ___, 402
P.3d at 1105-1106.
Significantly, Lee did not hold that the state was required, in order for the search
incident to arrest exception to apply, to affirmatively demonstrate that the officer planned
not to arrest the suspect before the search. Likewise, other authorities cited by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Lee, which held that the search incident to arrest exception was
inapplicable in those cases, did so only after the evidence affirmatively and clearly
demonstrated that the officer planned not to arrest the suspect until the search revealed
contraband. See People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d 237, 238-240 (N.Y. 2014) (finding the search
incident to arrest exception inapplicable where the officer specifically testified, at the
suppression hearing, that he was not going to arrest the suspect until he discovered
contraband during a patdown search); State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 324, 324-325 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1990) (finding the search incident to arrest exception inapplicable where both
officers involved in a contact with the suspect agreed that the suspect would not have
been arrested if contraband had not been found during the search); People v. Macabeo,
384 P.3d 1189, 1196-1197 (Cal. 2016) (finding the search incident to arrest exception
inapplicable where state law precluded the officers from arresting the suspect before the
search revealed contraband, because “[o]nce it was clear that an arrest was not going to
take place, the justification for a search incident to arrest was no longer operative.”
(emphasis in original)).
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In the present case, like in Lee, Rawlings, and Smith, Officer Hutchison possessed
probable cause to arrest Barone before he searched him. However, unlike in Lee, a
review of the totality of the circumstances in the present case demonstrates that Officer
Hutchison had no affirmative plan not to arrest Barone at the time of the search. In Lee,
the officer specifically told the suspect, before the search was conducted, that he would
be cited for driving without privileges. Lee, 162 at ___, 402 P.3d at 1099. The officer’s
statement indicated that, if not for finding contraband in the containers, the suspect would
not have been arrested.

In the present case, Officer Hutchison did not specifically

indicate to Barone that he planned merely to cite him. Instead, Officer Hutchison merely
told Barone that he was detained at the time of the search. (PH Tr., p.22, Ls.8-11.) Thus,
in neither his statement to Barone, nor in his other testimony at the preliminary hearing or
suppression hearing, did Officer Hutchison indicate that he specifically planned merely to
cite Barone for being under the influence of controlled substances, or that he planned to
release Barone without citing or arresting him.
Further, unlike in Lee, in which the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the officer’s
search of the containers could not have resulted in the discovery of evidence supporting
the driving without privileges charge in that case, it was reasonable to believe that
evidence contained in Barone’s pocket could support a charge of being under the
influence of controlled substances in public – and in fact, such evidence was found
(methamphetamine). Therefore, application of the second historical rationale for the
search incident to arrest exception – preservation of evidence – supports a determination
that Officer Hutchison either affirmatively planned to arrest Barone by the time of the
search, or that he had not yet decided whether to do so.
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Finally, at the time the search was conducted, Officer Hutchison had observed that
Barone and the female driver of the vehicle both “appeared extremely agitated and
fidgety,” that Barone appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine, and that
the two adults were in the presence of three children in the vehicle. (R., pp.82-83.) At
the hearing on the motion to suppress, when Officer Hutchison was asked what charges
he felt he had probable cause to arrest Barone for, he answered, “under the influence in
public as well as some other charges I continued to investigate such as injury to child
because there were syringes located by my partner in the passenger compartment
immediately accessible to the children; injury to child, possible DUI.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.215.) Officer Hutchison also testified that, in light of the condition of Barone and the
female driver, he was concerned about the safety of the three children. (Tr., p.23, L.18 –
p.24, L.3.) It seems unlikely that Officer Hutchison would leave two adults whom
appeared to be under the influence of controlled substances, and whom he was
investigating for injury to child and DUI charges, alone with three children and a vehicle
at a parking lot.
A review of the totality of the circumstances of this case does not affirmatively
demonstrate that Officer Hutchison would have cited and released Barone if he had not
found the contraband in Barone’s pocket. Therefore, Barone has failed to demonstrate
that the district court erred by concluding that the search was justified by the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. In the alternative, this Court
should remand the case so that the district court may specifically apply Lee. 4

4

The district court and the parties did not have the benefit of Lee, which was decided
approximately eight months after the district court entered its order denying Barone’s
motion to suppress. (R., pp.81-103.)
12

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of convictions
and the district court’s denial of Barone’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson__________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of January, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Mark W. Olson___________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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